
Beyond the Tick Box: Rethinking Checklists in Modern Bridge Operations
Checklists have long been regarded as essential tools for enhancing navigational safety and standardisation in maritime operations. However, their overuse and misapplication can lead to complacency, reduced situational awareness, and erosion of the human element. Drawing on practical onboard navigation assessments, this article examines the unintended consequences of repetitive tick-box checklists and proposes a shift towards more dynamic, thinking-based approach that better supports Bridge Resource Management (BRM) and safe decision-making, in line with Nautical Institute and IMO human element guidance.
Introduction
During onboard navigation assessments, it is not uncommon to find a fully completed checklist alongside an incomplete understanding of the situation on the bridge. This disconnect between compliance and competence is not the result of negligence, but of a system that increasingly prioritises procedural completion over cognitive engagement. The implications for safe navigation are significant. The modern bridge is increasingly governed by procedures, many of which are encapsulated in checklists designed to reduce error and ensure compliance safety management system (SMS). While their value in high-risk and non-routine operations is well established, operational experience suggests that their routine and repetitive use may be undermining the very safety culture they are intended to support.
This concern is not theoretical. It is consistently observed during onboard navigation assessments, where the gap between procedural compliance and actual competence becomes evident, an issue closely aligned with the IMO’s recognition that human factors remain a leading contributor to marine incidents.
The Problem with Repetition
Repetition breeds familiarity, and familiarity can breed complacency at times. When navigating officers complete the same checklists repeatedly, the process often becomes mechanical rather than analytical. The Nautical Institute, through its work on Bridge Resource Management and human element awareness, consistently emphasises that procedures must support not replace situational awareness and professional judgement.
Case Example 1: The Completed Checklist – The Unverified Reality
During a pre-departure assessment, a full bridge checklist had been completed and signed by the Officer of the Watch. All items were marked as checked, including gyro error verification and position fixing systems.
However, when questioned:
The gyro error had not been physically verified against a known bearing
The secondary position fixing method had not been cross-checked
The checklist had been completed based on expectation rather than action.
This reflects a breakdown in what the IMO describes as “active monitoring and verification”, a core element of safe watchkeeping under STCW.
The Illusion of Safety
A completed checklist can create a false sense of security, suggesting that all risks have been addressed. IMO’s Bridge Procedures Guide (published by the Nautical Institute) stresses that navigation is a continuous process, requiring ongoing appraisal, planning, execution, and monitoring not a series of discrete, completed tasks.
Case Example 2: Pilotage Checklist Completed – Situation Changed
During a pilotage transit in congested waters, the Master confirmed that the pilotage checklist had been completed prior to arrival.
Shortly after commencing the transit:
Traffic density increased significantly beyond initial expectations
A developing close-quarters situation emerged
Despite this, the bridge team continued under the assumption that the operation was “under control” because all preparatory steps had been completed.
No dynamic reassessment was verbalised.
This illustrates a key human element risk identified by the IMO: over-reliance on procedures at the expense of situational awareness.
Impact on the Human Element
Over-reliance on checklists can reduce engagement, suppress challenge, and shift focus from understanding to compliance. The Nautical Institute’s work on BRM highlights that effective bridge teams rely on:
Communication
Challenge and response
Shared mental models
Not passive adherence to procedures.
Case Example 3: The Silent Bridge
During a confined waters passage, a junior officer was observed completing a checklist quietly while the vessel approached a critical course alteration.
No discussion took place within the bridge team
No challenge was made when a small but significant cross-track error developed
The checklist was completed, but situational awareness was degraded
When asked afterwards, the officer stated:
“I was focused on finishing the checklist before the turn.”
This behaviour directly contradicts STCW principles of effective bridge teamwork and continuous monitoring.
From Compliance to Cognition
The solution is not to eliminate checklists, but to redefine their role. Both the IMO and the Nautical Institute advocate for a human-centred approach to safety, where procedures support decision-making rather than replace it.
Case Example 4: Effective Use of Challenge–Response
On a well-managed bridge during departure:
The Master and OOW used verbal challenge–response throughout
Key items were discussed, not ticked silently
The team actively cross-checked position, engine status, and traffic
The result was:
High engagement
Shared situational awareness
Immediate correction of discrepancies
This aligns closely with BRM best practices promoted by the Nautical Institute and reflected in the Bridge Procedures Guide.
Practical Alternatives in Operation
Experience from onboard assessments, supported by industry guidance, highlights several behaviours that improve safety:
1. Challenge–Response Communication
Encourages active participation and aligns with BRM principles.
2. Scenario-Based Briefings
Supports the IMO’s emphasis on planning and anticipation.
3. Focus on Critical Control Points
Reduces procedural overload and aligns attention with risk.
4. Cognitive Prompts
Encourage the “thinking navigator” advocated in Nautical Institute publications such as The Navigator.
5. Continuous Risk Awareness
Case Example 5: Dynamic Thinking Preventing Escalation
During a coastal passage, an Officer of the Watch stated:
“Traffic is building ahead this is becoming an amber situation.”
This triggered:
Increased vigilance
Early intervention
Master’s involvement
This behaviour reflects proactive risk management, a key element of both IMO safety philosophy and Nautical Institute guidance.
A Balanced Approach
Checklists remain valuable, particularly for:
Emergency procedures
Non-routine operations
Critical safety barriers
The IMO does not advocate their removal, but rather their effective use within a broader safety system.
However, routine overuse can lead to:
Procedural fatigue
Reduced engagement
Complacency
The Nautical Institute consistently reinforces that competence is demonstrated through behaviour, not documentation.
Conclusion
Safe navigation depends not on the completion of procedures, but on the quality of human performance. Operational experience from onboard navigation assessments, supported by IMO and Nautical Institute guidance, demonstrates that:
Compliance does not equal competence
Completed checklists do not guarantee safety
The human element remains the decisive factor
The challenge for the maritime industry is clear: move beyond measuring what is easy to record and focus instead on what truly matters situational awareness, communication, and decision-making. By repositioning checklists as aids rather than absolutes, and by reinforcing the principles of BRM and human-centred navigation, bridge teams can move beyond the tick box and towards genuine navigational excellence.
