Throughout my years at sea as a navigating officer, Master, navigation assessor, and onboard trainer, I have observed something that has continued to challenge my understanding of navigational competence. I have sailed with officers who possessed excellent certificates, impressive sea time, and strong theoretical knowledge, yet during critical navigational situations they struggled to cope with pressure, became hesitant in their decision-making, or lost situational awareness at key moments. At the same time, I have also sailed with officers of lesser experience who remained calm, adaptive, and composed under exactly the same conditions. For many years, I believed the explanation was simply experience, however, over time and particularly during navigation assessments conducted in challenging coastal waters, high traffic density, and pilotage situations I began to realise that the issue was far more complex. It became increasingly clear to me that sea time alone does not always produce competence.

Experience Without Exposure

One of the most common patterns I observed involved officers who had accumulated significant sea service, primarily in open ocean conditions. On paper, they appeared highly experienced. However, when exposed to complex navigational environments requiring rapid decision-making, continuous situational awareness, and traffic assessment, some struggled considerably. In several cases, these officers relied heavily on ECDIS, reacted slowly to developing situations, and required frequent intervention from senior officers. Further discussion often revealed that their previous service had provided limited exposure to complex navigational situations, restricting the development of practical skills such as pilotage, traffic assessment, situational awareness, and independent decision-making under pressure.

These experiences reinforced an important lesson for me:

The quality and depth of experience matter far more than sea time alone.

The Gap Between Knowledge and Performance

I also encountered junior officers who had performed exceptionally well during pre-sea education and examinations. Their theoretical knowledge was often impressive. They could explain regulations, procedures, and navigational principles accurately and confidently. Yet during real bridge operations, particularly under stress, some found it difficult to translate theory into practice. Under pressure, I observed hesitation, fixation on instruments, delayed responses, and an inability to effectively prioritise multiple developing risks. In many cases, their bridge experience had been largely observational, with limited opportunity to actively participate in decision-making under supervision. 

This led me to question whether our industry places too much emphasis on technical knowledge while underestimating the importance of practical exposure, mentorship, and human performance development.

Different People, Different Responses

Perhaps the most fascinating observation throughout my career has been how differently officers respond to stress. Two officers with similar qualifications, similar sea time, and similar training backgrounds can react completely differently during the same navigational situation. One may remain calm, focused, and proactive, while another becomes overloaded, hesitant, or overly dependent on guidance from others. For many years, I viewed this purely as a difference in competence or confidence.

Today, I believe there may be a deeper human factors dimension involved.

The Psychological Side of Navigation

Navigation is often discussed as a technical discipline, but in reality it is also deeply psychological. During critical situations on the bridge, the human mind is placed under enormous pressure. Traffic density, confined waters, fatigue, commercial pressure, environmental conditions, and fear of making mistakes can all influence cognitive performance. Over time, I began to wonder whether some behavioural responses observed on the bridge may be influenced not only by training and experience, but also by subconscious psychological conditioning developed over many years of an individual. Some officers appear naturally composed during stress. Others become mentally overloaded very quickly. In certain situations, officers may fixate on a single task, lose awareness of the wider situation, hesitate in decision-making, or avoid taking initiative altogether.

I do not believe this necessarily reflects intelligence or even technical ability. Rather, it may reflect how different individuals process stress internally. As human beings, our responses to pressure are shaped throughout life through upbringing, education, previous experiences, leadership environments, criticism, confidence development, and repeated exposure to stressful situations.

It is possible that deeply embedded negative experiences, fear-based environments, or prolonged exposure to excessive criticism can subconsciously influence how an individual reacts under pressure later in life, including on the bridge of a ship. This is not about removing accountability or labelling individuals. It is about recognising that human performance is more complex than the industry sometimes acknowledges.

The Role of Bridge Culture

In my experience, bridge culture plays a major role in shaping navigational performance. Supportive Masters and senior officers who encourage participation, mentorship, and supervised decision-making often help junior officers develop confidence and resilience far more effectively than fear-based leadership styles. Conversely, environments dominated by criticism, intimidation, or excessive hierarchy can discourage communication and gradually reduce confidence, particularly in junior officers. I have seen officers who were technically capable become passive simply because they feared making mistakes or being criticised. This may be one of the hidden dangers within bridge resource management that procedures alone cannot solve.

A Wider Understanding of Competence

The maritime industry has made tremendous progress in technology, simulation, procedures, and training standards. However, I believe we still assess competence primarily through observable technical performance while paying far less attention to the deeper human factors influencing behaviour under pressure. From my experience, true navigational competence is not simply the product of certification or sea time.

It is shaped by:

• Quality of exposure

• Mentorship

• Bridge culture

• Confidence development

• Emotional resilience

• Practical participation

• Psychological response to stress

• and the ability to remain situationally aware under pressure

Perhaps the missing link in navigational safety is not only better training, but a better understanding of the human mind itself during stressful situations. Modern ships are increasingly defined by sophisticated integrated bridge systems, yet the greatest uncertainty in navigation may still lie in understanding the human thoughts, emotions, and decision-making processes behind the technology.

Conclusion

After many years at sea and observing officers from different backgrounds, nationalities, cultures, and experience levels, I have come to believe that competence cannot be measured solely by certificates, rank, or years of service. The bridge is ultimately a human environment, and human beings do not all respond to stress in the same way. If we genuinely want to improve navigational safety, then we may need to move beyond traditional definitions of competence and begin exploring the psychological and human factors that shape decision-making during critical moments at sea. Only then can we begin to understand why some officers thrive under pressure while others struggle and what the industry can do to better develop navigators of the future.