

Protec Monthly Executive Brief
Monthly Executive Brief: Maritime Safety & Operational Risk
Move beyond documentary compliance. Get Captain Keith Stevens’ monthly executive assessments on global inspection campaigns, critical IMO/SOLAS amendments, and real-world Bridge Resource Management (BRM) risks facing your fleet today.
Why it matters:
Evolving vetting expectations under SIRE 2.0, heightened sanctions scrutiny, and expanding LNG operations require continuous crew readiness and proactive commercial risk management.
Closer attention:
Fleet managers and vetting teams should focus on the following:
Incorporate SIRE 2.0 inspection trends and human-reliability lessons into pre-vetting crew briefings.
Review charterparty war-risk clauses and sanctions screening controls against false-flag registries.
Validate STCW-aligned LNG safety competencies and refresher training for crews operating gas-fuelled vessels.
Confirmed developments:
Industry bodies continue to strengthen vetting, ship-terminal safety, and alternative fuel competence. INTERTANKO’s 6 November notices reported outcomes from its Mumbai Asian Regional Panel and vetting seminar emphasising human reliability, alongside war-risk-clause guidance and a false-flag sanctions alert. OCIMF’s October newsletter confirmed over 44,000 completed SIRE 2.0 inspections with ongoing feedback reviews, while IMO reported on 5 November that trainers from four Southeast Asian nations completed an LNG-fuelled ship safety workshop in Japan (22–30 October) supporting STCW implementation.
Protec Marine Solutions recommends integrating SIRE 2.0 human-factor insights, updated war-risk protocols, and verified LNG training standards into fleet management systems.
18 Nov 2026
Why it matters:
Adverse weather, restricted-waterway transits, and high-traffic port approaches remain primary triggers for structural damage, infrastructure allisions, and personnel injuries.
Closer attention:
Fleet and bridge leadership should examine the following operational review points:
Assess heavy-weather anchoring, mooring line integrity, and tug assistance thresholds during adverse forecasts.
Verify dead-ship towage contingency plans and towline inspection protocols for unmanned or laid-up tonnage.
Reinforce master-pilot exchange, bridge resource management, and clearance monitoring during bridge and river transits.
Evaluate passing-ship interaction risks and speed control near moored passenger or high-occupancy vessels.
Confirmed developments:
Several high-profile navigational and mooring incidents were recorded across global ports and coastal waters. Severe weather contributed to the 25 October Bremerhaven collision involving MEIN SCHIFF 3 and two berthed containerships, as well as the Black Sea strandings and groundings of tankers GRACE ROMAVICTOR (14 October, parted towline) and BANDA (15 October, refloated 20 October). In US waters, bulk carrier Strategic Alliance contacted the Tacony-Palmyra Bridge on 12 November, and carrier Atlantic Asphalt struck moored river cruise vessel American Heritage in New Orleans on 13 November, resulting in 32 noncritical injuries.
Protec Marine Solutions encourages operators to use these cases to benchmark heavy-weather mooring protocols, towage contingencies, and pilotage bridge team management.
18 Nov 2026
Why it matters:
Unverified survey deadlines, non-compliant bunker documentation, or outdated cargo securing records expose vessels to immediate Port State Control detentions and operational delays.
Closer attention:
Technical and marine superintendents should verify the following:
Confirm supplier fuel flashpoint declarations and escalation procedures are embedded in bunkering checklists.
Audit lifting appliance registers, certificates, and ship-specific renewal survey deadlines under SOLAS II-1/3-13.
Verify PFOS-free extinguishing media documentation and maintain certified disposal records for replaced foam.
Ensure electronic inclinometer mandates are scoped accurately to applicable newbuilds rather than applied indiscriminately to tankers.
Review onboard cargo securing arrangements and lashing documentation ahead of ongoing Concentrated Inspection Campaign checks.
Confirmed developments:
Key 2026 SOLAS and MSC mandates are actively enforced across renewal surveys. MSC.520(106) requires pre-bunkering fuel flashpoint declarations and Bunker Delivery Note entries, SOLAS II-1/3-13 mandates lifting appliance testing and Safe Working Load evidence by the first renewal survey on or after 1 January 2026, and SOLAS II-2/10.11 prohibits PFOS extinguishing media. Electronic inclinometers apply solely to new containerships and bulk carriers of 3,000 GT and above. Additionally, the joint Concentrated Inspection Campaign on cargo securing runs from 1 September to 30 November 2026.
Protec Marine Solutions advises operators to verify survey deadline compliance, audit hazardous media inventories, and validate cargo securing manuals prior to port calls.
18 Nov 2026
Why it matters:
Grounded tankers require rapid, coordinated salvage and cargo-lightering operations to prevent marine pollution and environmental liability.
Closer attention:
Shore emergency response and fleet teams should ensure the following:
Verify SOPEP/SMPEP contact lists and coastal state notification procedures are current.
Maintain updated damage-stability models and emergency cargo-transfer plans.
Conduct tabletop salvage and lightering drills with qualified responders.
Confirmed development:
On 12 November 2026, Reuters reported an Omani emergency committee review covering cargo-handling and response operations for a tanker aground off Al Qibliyah Island (an in-period response update without disclosed vessel identity or occurrence date).
Protec Marine Solutions recommends verifying shipboard oil pollution emergency plans (SOPEP) and lightering contingencies.
12 Nov 2026
Why it matters:
Vessels anchored in light ballast present high windage and shallow propeller immersion, increasing the likelihood of rapid anchor dragging in squalls.
Closer attention:
Masters and bridge watchkeepers should ensure the following:
Assess heavy-weather ballast conditions to reduce windage and maintain effective propeller immersion.
Set tight ECDIS and radar anchor-dragging guard rings with continuous bridge watchkeeping.
Heave up anchor and proceed to open sea early if wind forces exceed anchorage holding limits.
Confirmed development:
On 9 November 2026, bulk carrier VTA NEPTUNE grounded near Chan May, Vietnam, after dragging anchor in strong winds and heavy seas while in ballast condition.
Protec Marine Solutions advises evaluating ballast draft adequacy and anchor-watch alarm thresholds during seasonal monsoons.
9 Nov 2026
Why it matters:
Machinery failure at narrow strait entrances leaves minimal drift time before rocky shore grounding and often prevents conventional lifeboat launches.
Closer attention:
Masters and chief engineers should ensure the following:
Complete pre-arrival propulsion, steering, and anchor readiness checks well clear of strait approaches.
Request standby tug assistance immediately upon experiencing any main engine or steering anomaly.
Brief crew on shore-based breeches-buoy or line-throwing rescue procedures when sea states preclude boat launches.
Confirmed development:
On 6 November 2026, cargo vessel BYB OTHELLO grounded near Anadolu Feneri at the Black Sea entrance to the Bosphorus following reported machinery failure, requiring shore-based evacuation of all 13 crew due to severe sea conditions.
Protec Marine Solutions recommends pre-strait machinery testing and prompt tug assistance requests upon any propulsion degradation.
6 Nov 2026
Why it matters:
In heavy following seas, an unmanned towed vessel can surge forward and collide with its towing tug if towline tension or course control is lost.
Closer attention:
Tug masters and marine towage superintendents should ensure the following:
Adjust towline catenary and scope appropriately when encountering steep following seas.
Monitor relative speed and heading between tug and unmanned tow continuously on radar.
Ensure quick-release towing mechanisms are tested and immediately accessible.
Confirmed development:
On 4 November 2026, tug AYAZ BEY collided with the unmanned tanker MENTOR it was towing off Romania following reported towline difficulties in bad weather, with three crew evacuated and four remaining aboard the anchored tug.
Protec Marine Solutions advises reviewing towline length adjustments and heavy-weather collision avoidance between tug and tow.
4 Nov 2026
Why it matters:
Heightened regional conflict, deceptive shipping practices, and GNSS jamming directly threaten crew safety and navigational integrity, increasing the risk of grounding, collision, and severe regulatory detention.
Closer attention:
Operators and bridge teams should prioritise the following:
Review voyage risk assessments and routing plans for high-risk Middle East transit corridors.
Verify charterparty and third-party vessel documentation to guard against false flags and concealed IMO numbers.
Prepare bridge teams with fallback terrestrial and radar navigation drills to counter GNSS spoofing or interference.
Monitor upcoming S-100 ECDIS transition timelines and ensure bridge equipment software remains compliant.
Confirmed developments:
IMO Council 138 met on 2–6 November, reporting at least 130 verified attacks in the Middle East region and 25 seafarer deaths, including the fatal attack on VELOS SAPPHIRE on 5 November. On 11 November, the IMO Secretary-General called for stricter SOLAS enforcement around Hormuz regarding substandard vessels, concealed IMO numbers, and fraudulent flags. Separately, INTERTANKO’s 9 October notice highlighted GNSS interference, navigational safety, and emerging S-100 ECDIS standards.
Protec Marine Solutions advises operators to reinforce voyage risk assessments, verify vessel identity protocols, and prepare bridge teams for electronic interference.
30 Oct 2026
Why it matters:
Routine operational lapses in enclosed spaces, heavy weather, or critical machinery maintenance frequently lead to preventable fatalities, loss of propulsion, and major vetting or Port State Control failures.
Closer attention:
Shipboard and shore management should ensure the following:
Audit ship-specific enclosed-space registers and verify multi-gas detectors include suitable CO₂ sensors.
Enforce strict deck access controls and formal risk assessments before permitting inspections in heavy seas.
Conduct realistic blackout recovery and engine-room fire drills to validate crew technical readiness.
Align safety-critical equipment lists and spare parts inventories with the updated OCIMF guidance ahead of SIRE 2.0 integration.
Confirmed developments:
Recent flag and industry notices highlight critical operational safety priorities. Liberia issued advisories on 29 and 30 October addressing PSC deficiencies in enclosed-space entry (referencing MSC.581(110) and CO₂ measurement) and fatal injuries during heavy-weather deck access. Meanwhile, INTERTANKO’s 2 October ISTEC notice covered blackout recovery and engine-room fire prevention, and OCIMF released revised Safety Critical Equipment and Spare Parts Guidance slated for future SIRE 2.0 integration.
Protec Marine Solutions recommends auditing onboard permit-to-work systems, heavy-weather restrictions, and critical equipment maintenance registers.
30 Oct 2026
Why it matters:
Propulsion failure inside a cyclone’s wind field eliminates a vessel’s ability to hold off a lee shore, endangering crew evacuation.
Closer attention:
Masters and fleet operations should ensure the following:
Execute early weather-routing diversions well before tropical cyclones close on coastal waters.
Verify fuel-oil purification, cooling systems, and main engine readiness prior to heavy-weather encounters.
Review abandon-ship and helicopter/shore rescue coordination plans with crew.
Confirmed development:
On 28 October 2026, the 32,688-dwt bulker SIGMA PEARL grounded off Andhra Pradesh during severe cyclone conditions following reported propulsion problems, resulting in the evacuation of all 20 crew (secondary reporting notes refloating on 7 November).
Protec Marine Solutions recommends early cyclone avoidance routing and pre-storm propulsion reliability checks.
28 Oct 2026
Why it matters:
The strongest safety organisations are not those that experience no reported problems. Rather, they are those that proactively identify weaknesses early, report them honestly, and act decisively before an accident occurs.
Closer attention:
Masters, senior officers, and shore managers must ensure that personnel are empowered and trained to do the following:
Understand the operational risks and recognise when conditions are deteriorating.
Communicate safety concerns promptly and without hesitation.
Challenge information or assumptions that do not appear correct.
Intervene proactively before the critical safety margin is lost.
Learn continuously from incidents occurring elsewhere in the industry.
Confirmed finding:
September's events show how quickly routine operations can develop into major casualties.
Effective safety leadership requires significantly more than merely issuing procedures and administrative directives.
22 Sept 2026
Why it matters:
Cargo information must be critically reviewed. Documentation should actively support operational decision-making rather than being accepted solely as a passive administrative requirement.
Closer attention:
Operational checks should include and address the following:
Verify accurate cargo declaration and documentation.
Ensure correct dangerous-goods classification, segregation, and stowage.
Confirm container mass verification and secure lashing arrangements.
Inspect lashings thoroughly following heavy weather.
Implement controls to identify undeclared or misdeclared cargo.
Assess moisture and liquefaction risks associated with solid bulk cargoes.
Monitor closely for toxic, flammable, or oxygen-depleting atmospheres.
Maintain continuous cargo-space monitoring and immediate access to cargo-specific emergency information.
Confirmed finding:
The IMO Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers held its twelfth session from 14 to 18 September. Its remit includes packaged dangerous goods, solid bulk cargoes, containers, liquefied gases in bulk, and ships using gases or other low-flashpoint fuels.
The session provides a timely reason for operators to confirm that cargo-management arrangements accurately reflect current requirements and vessel-specific risks.
22 Sept 2026
Why it matters:
Emergency readiness should be evaluated by the vessel's ability to respond under difficult conditions, not solely by the completion of mandatory administrative drill records.
Closer attention:
Vessels should ensure the following actionable controls:
Maintain fully operational GMDSS equipment and verify that emergency contact information is current.
Register EPIRBs and personal locating devices correctly with the relevant authorities.
Prepare rescue boats, launching systems, and recovery-from-the-water plans for immediate deployment.
Ensure personnel thoroughly understand both distress and urgency communications.
Conduct drills that incorporate realistic casualty recovery scenarios.
Equip bridge teams to establish accurate search datum information and sustain medical care following a recovery.
Confirmed finding:
On 10 September, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands conducted SARex 2026, a multinational search-and-rescue exercise over the North Sea, supported by EMSA, EFCA, and Frontex.
The exercise highlights the importance of coordination between ships, rescue coordination centres, aircraft, and national authorities.
22 Sept 2026
Why it matters:
Shore management must strike a careful balance between effectively communicating emerging risks and supporting vessel commands. It is vital to ensure that crucial safety, security, and welfare protocols are implemented without overwhelming crews with unnecessary administrative instructions. A proactive, fleet-wide approach to these priorities directly sustains operational excellence.
Closer attention:
Fleet managers and command teams should action the following priorities:
Review voyage-security assessments for the Middle East, Gulf of Aden, and other elevated-risk areas.
Confirm that crews have received current security briefings and fully understand emergency-reporting arrangements.
Conduct a focused review of passenger, ro-ro, and vehicle-space fire precautions where applicable.
Verify collision-avoidance standards for vessels at anchor and during periods of reduced bridge activity.
Discuss autonomous and remotely operated craft during bridge-team meetings and navigational risk assessments.
Audit dangerous-goods documentation, container securing, and bulk-cargo acceptance procedures.
Confirm the implementation of the amended PSSR training and anti-harassment requirements.
Test recovery-from-the-water arrangements and the operational readiness of lifesaving appliances.
Review whether near misses are being reported promptly and analysed for wider fleet trends.
Ensure shore management communicates emerging risks effectively without overburdening vessels with excessive administration.
Confirmed finding:
The operational and safety developments throughout September highlight several critical areas requiring immediate and focused oversight. Consolidating the lessons learned from recent maritime incidents, regulatory updates, and evolving security threats is essential for maintaining comprehensive fleet resilience.
Implementing these priorities ensures that both physical and psychological safety standards are upheld across all operations.
22 Sept 2026
Why it matters:
Automation may support navigation, but it does not remove the bridge team's responsibility to maintain situational awareness, question unexpected information, and take timely action.
Closer attention:
Masters and navigators should consider and address the following when interacting with autonomous systems:
Evaluate how an autonomous vessel may detect and classify surrounding traffic.
Assess whether the autonomous vessel's intentions are readily apparent to conventional vessels.
Recognise the limitations of AIS information and communications with remote-control centres.
Anticipate potential uncertainty regarding the autonomous vessel's lookout and decision-making arrangements.
Formulate contingency actions in the event that the autonomous craft behaves unexpectedly.
Record any unusual encounters as near misses or navigational hazards.
Confirmed finding:
On 17 September, the MAIB issued an interim report concerning the 2025 collision between the crew transfer vessel Iceni Legend and the unmanned surface vessel X18 in an offshore wind farm. The publication of an interim report should not be interpreted as a final determination of cause. It does, however, reinforce the need to prepare bridge teams for increasing interaction with remotely operated and autonomous craft.
Additionally, the IMO's non-mandatory MASS Code took effect on 1 July 2026, establishing an international safety framework for autonomous and remotely operated cargo ships.
22 Sept 2026
Why it matters:
Security instructions must be sufficiently clear to support rapid action without creating confusion between the Master, company security personnel, and external authorities. Ultimately, commercial considerations must never override the Master's fundamental responsibility to protect the vessel and its crew.
Closer attention:
Ensure voyage-specific security assessments are current and routing decisions reflect the latest threat information.
Implement BMP Maritime Security measures and Ship Security Plan controls practically.
Test citadels, communications, emergency alarms, and access controls thoroughly prior to transit.
Brief crew members clearly before they enter elevated-risk areas.
Maintain immediate availability of medical, fire, and damage-control resources.
Provide continuous support and monitoring from shore management throughout the transit.
Confirmed finding:
Security conditions affecting international shipping remain a major operational concern. As of 15 September, the IMO verified 80 attacks on merchant vessels in and around the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in at least 22 seafarer fatalities. Several vessels were reportedly damaged during September, with fatalities, missing personnel, and pollution concerns recorded in individual cases.
Furthermore, the IMO has warned of renewed piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters, including the continued captivity of seafarers.
22 Sept 2026
Why it matters:
Psychological safety is directly connected to operational safety. A person who does not feel able to report harassment may also hesitate to challenge an unsafe navigational, engineering, or cargo decision.
Closer attention:
A credible system should ensure the following:
Define unacceptable behaviour clearly and comprehensively.
Ensure personnel know precisely how and where to report their concerns.
Treat all reports confidentially and make it clear that retaliation is not tolerated.
Examine allegations impartially and ensure affected personnel can easily obtain support.
Verify that Masters and senior officers fully understand their leadership responsibilities.
Monitor reporting patterns from shore management rather than treating each complaint in isolation.
Confirmed finding:
Updated UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency guidance published on 3 September addresses the implementation of the amended STCW Personal Safety and Social Responsibilities requirements. The amendments, in force since 1 January 2026, introduce mandatory competence concerning the prevention of and response to violence, harassment, sexual harassment, bullying, and sexual assault.
Companies should verify that training, reporting channels, and onboard procedures are genuinely understood to establish a credible system.
22 Sept 2026
Why it matters:
Drills should test decision-making under realistic conditions rather than merely demonstrating procedural compliance. Particular attention must be given to the critical time required to detect an emergency, alert the command team, assess the developing situation, and begin an organised passenger response.
Closer attention:
While operators should avoid speculation regarding causation, these events justify an immediate review of the following:
Evaluate fire detection, alarm arrangements, and patrols of vehicle, accommodation, and machinery spaces.
Verify the control of ignition sources, ventilation, and emergency shutdowns.
Confirm watertight and weathertight integrity, stability information, and loading control.
Assess passenger accounting systems, clear escape routes, emergency lighting, and signage.
Ensure life-saving appliance readiness, effective crowd management, and clear abandonment procedures.
Validate crew familiarity with their specific individual emergency duties.
Confirmed finding:
September has provided a severe reminder of the consequences of passenger-vessel fires and loss of stability.
At the opening of the IMO's September cargo and container safety session, the Secretary-General referred to the fire involving MV June Aster near Coron in the Philippines on 9 September and the capsize of Virgo Transport 8 in the Java Sea on 13 September. At the time of the statement, significant loss of life and numbers of missing persons had been reported. Investigations will be required to establish the precise circumstances and causes of these events.
21 Sept 2026
Why it matters:
Anchoring should not be treated as a passive operational condition. Bridge teams must remain continuously prepared for dragging anchor, traffic misjudgement, equipment failure, and the unexpected actions of other vessels.
Closer attention:
The event reinforces the following established navigational controls:
Maintain an effective lookout and systematically monitor radar and AIS information on anchored vessels.
Assess approaching traffic early and resolve any uncertainty before the safety margin becomes restricted.
Challenge and thoroughly verify all collision warnings.
Execute avoiding action that is early, positive, and readily apparent.
Ensure that machinery readiness accurately reflects the vessel's exposure to risk.
Prohibit the use of VHF communication as a replacement for the strict application of the COLREGs.
Confirmed finding:
The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch recorded a preliminary assessment into the collision between the container ship Mira and the anchored crude-oil tanker Primero, approximately nine nautical miles east of Hartlepool on 27 August. The investigation listing was updated in September.
No conclusions should be drawn while the matter remains under assessment.
20 Sept 2026
Why it matters:
A completed risk assessment can become an administrative permission to proceed. For a master or navigation auditor, the decisive question is whether it contains measurable abort, delay or no-go criteria.
Closer attention:
Require numerical limits where practicable: current, wind, under-keel clearance, visibility and tug capability.
Record who has authority to postpone or abort.
Challenge reliance on previous successful track lines.
Verify that dynamic environmental conditions are reassessed immediately before the critical stage.
Examine whether commercial pressure has silently shifted the acceptable-risk threshold.
Confirmed finding:
In the Myra Eckstein casualty, the crew completed company briefings and a green–amber–red assessment, added an experienced captain and complied with the high-water plan. Nevertheless, the tow struck a bridge because extreme current and local hydrodynamic forces exceeded its manoeuvring capability.
The investigation shows that procedural compliance did not make the transit safe.
10 Aug 2026
Why it matters:
Transitional regulatory changes commonly produce gaps between revised company procedures, certificates, planned-maintenance systems and officers’ understanding.
Closer attention:
Sample bunker documentation for the required flashpoint declaration and test method.
Verify that service providers and records satisfy the revised lifesaving-appliance regime.
Check flag, class and company circulars against onboard manuals and PMS tasks.
For gas carriers, LNG-fuelled and polar-operating vessels, conduct a vessel-specific applicability review.
Confirmed change:
Amendments effective during 2026 include:
New SOLAS provisions concerning fuel-oil flashpoint declarations before bunkering.
Revised requirements for lifeboat and rescue-boat maintenance, testing, overhaul and repair.
Amendments affecting fire-safety systems, protective coatings, the LSA Code and Polar Code.
New Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea emission-control requirements from 1 March 2026.
IGC Code amendments effective from 1 July 2026.
10 Aug 2026
Why it matters:
A paused framework is not evidence that the underlying navigational, security or crew-welfare risk has disappeared. Voyage planning must integrate rapidly changing security information, port access, communications and seafarer consent or welfare concerns.
Closer attention:
Revalidate voyage risk assessments immediately before entering the region.
Confirm emergency communications, company escalation arrangements and contingency ports.
Consider fatigue, anxiety and prolonged confinement as navigational hazards.
Ensure masters receive clear authority to delay, divert or stop when conditions depart from the approved assessment.
Confirmed position:
IMO reports that its voluntary framework assisted 136 merchant ships and approximately 2,900 seafarers to leave the Persian Gulf in June. As of 6 August, the evacuation plan was described as paused.
10 Aug 2026
Why it matters:
This is a strong casualty-based confirmation that pilotage does not reduce the master’s or bridge team’s responsibility. BRM failed because intervention authority existed but was not exercised.
Closer attention:
Include pilot distraction and inappropriate phone use in master–pilot exchange expectations.
Audit whether officers understand when and how to challenge a pilot.
Use simulator or tabletop scenarios requiring a junior officer to intervene.
Look for “polite silence,” excessive deference and the normalisation of poor conduct.
Verify that lookout duties include visual observation, radar/ECDIS monitoring and the correct VTS channel.
Confirmed finding:
The US NTSB found that the Yangze 7 bridge team, its pilot and the captain of Miss Peggy lost situational awareness through failure to maintain a proper lookout. The pilot was distracted by extended non-operational mobile-phone use.
Crucially, the ship’s bridge team observed the behaviour but did not challenge it. The towboat was detected less than one ship-length ahead.
The NTSB recommended prohibiting non-operational electronic-device use by anyone directing a vessel’s movement. NTSB investigation report
10 Aug 2026
Why it matters:
Inspectors will test practical implementation, not simply the presence of a manual. An officer unable to explain stack-weight limits, securing arrangements or heavy-weather precautions may expose the ship to detention even where paperwork appears complete.
Closer attention:
Physically sample fixed and portable securing devices for damage, incompatibility and missing components.
Confirm the cargo plan incorporates verified gross masses.
Test officers’ knowledge against actual loading conditions.
Compare heavy-weather records, routeing decisions and lashing inspections with SMS requirements.
Check that cargo does not compromise SOLAS bridge visibility.
Confirmed change:
The Paris and Tokyo MoUs will conduct a joint Concentrated Inspection Campaign from 1 September to 30 November 2026, alongside routine port-state inspections. Deficiencies can result in detention. The questionnaire covers the approved Cargo Securing Manual, officers’ familiarity, verified container weights, equipment condition, bridge visibility and heavy-weather procedures.
Several questions are explicitly marked as potential detention grounds.
