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Protec Monthly Executive Brief

Monthly Executive Brief: Maritime Safety & Operational Risk

Move beyond documentary compliance. Get Captain Keith Stevens’ monthly executive assessments on global inspection campaigns, critical IMO/SOLAS amendments, and real-world Bridge Resource Management (BRM) risks facing your fleet today.

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Why it matters:

The strongest safety organisations are not those that experience no reported problems. Rather, they are those that proactively identify weaknesses early, report them honestly, and act decisively before an accident occurs.

Closer attention:

Masters, senior officers, and shore managers must ensure that personnel are empowered and trained to do the following:

  • Understand the operational risks and recognise when conditions are deteriorating.

  • Communicate safety concerns promptly and without hesitation.

  • Challenge information or assumptions that do not appear correct.

  • Intervene proactively before the critical safety margin is lost.

  • Learn continuously from incidents occurring elsewhere in the industry.

Confirmed finding:


September's events show how quickly routine operations can develop into major casualties.


Effective safety leadership requires significantly more than merely issuing procedures and administrative directives.


22 Sept 2026

Why it matters:

Cargo information must be critically reviewed. Documentation should actively support operational decision-making rather than being accepted solely as a passive administrative requirement.

Closer attention:

Operational checks should include and address the following:

  • Verify accurate cargo declaration and documentation.

  • Ensure correct dangerous-goods classification, segregation, and stowage.

  • Confirm container mass verification and secure lashing arrangements.

  • Inspect lashings thoroughly following heavy weather.

  • Implement controls to identify undeclared or misdeclared cargo.

  • Assess moisture and liquefaction risks associated with solid bulk cargoes.

  • Monitor closely for toxic, flammable, or oxygen-depleting atmospheres.

  • Maintain continuous cargo-space monitoring and immediate access to cargo-specific emergency information.

Confirmed finding:


The IMO Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers held its twelfth session from 14 to 18 September. Its remit includes packaged dangerous goods, solid bulk cargoes, containers, liquefied gases in bulk, and ships using gases or other low-flashpoint fuels.


The session provides a timely reason for operators to confirm that cargo-management arrangements accurately reflect current requirements and vessel-specific risks.


22 Sept 2026

Why it matters:

Emergency readiness should be evaluated by the vessel's ability to respond under difficult conditions, not solely by the completion of mandatory administrative drill records.

Closer attention:

Vessels should ensure the following actionable controls:

  • Maintain fully operational GMDSS equipment and verify that emergency contact information is current.

  • Register EPIRBs and personal locating devices correctly with the relevant authorities.

  • Prepare rescue boats, launching systems, and recovery-from-the-water plans for immediate deployment.

  • Ensure personnel thoroughly understand both distress and urgency communications.

  • Conduct drills that incorporate realistic casualty recovery scenarios.

  • Equip bridge teams to establish accurate search datum information and sustain medical care following a recovery.

Confirmed finding:


On 10 September, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands conducted SARex 2026, a multinational search-and-rescue exercise over the North Sea, supported by EMSA, EFCA, and Frontex.


The exercise highlights the importance of coordination between ships, rescue coordination centres, aircraft, and national authorities.


22 Sept 2026

Why it matters:

Shore management must strike a careful balance between effectively communicating emerging risks and supporting vessel commands. It is vital to ensure that crucial safety, security, and welfare protocols are implemented without overwhelming crews with unnecessary administrative instructions. A proactive, fleet-wide approach to these priorities directly sustains operational excellence.

Closer attention:

Fleet managers and command teams should action the following priorities:

  • Review voyage-security assessments for the Middle East, Gulf of Aden, and other elevated-risk areas.

  • Confirm that crews have received current security briefings and fully understand emergency-reporting arrangements.

  • Conduct a focused review of passenger, ro-ro, and vehicle-space fire precautions where applicable.

  • Verify collision-avoidance standards for vessels at anchor and during periods of reduced bridge activity.

  • Discuss autonomous and remotely operated craft during bridge-team meetings and navigational risk assessments.

  • Audit dangerous-goods documentation, container securing, and bulk-cargo acceptance procedures.

  • Confirm the implementation of the amended PSSR training and anti-harassment requirements.

  • Test recovery-from-the-water arrangements and the operational readiness of lifesaving appliances.

  • Review whether near misses are being reported promptly and analysed for wider fleet trends.

  • Ensure shore management communicates emerging risks effectively without overburdening vessels with excessive administration.

Confirmed finding:


The operational and safety developments throughout September highlight several critical areas requiring immediate and focused oversight. Consolidating the lessons learned from recent maritime incidents, regulatory updates, and evolving security threats is essential for maintaining comprehensive fleet resilience.


Implementing these priorities ensures that both physical and psychological safety standards are upheld across all operations.


22 Sept 2026

Why it matters:

Automation may support navigation, but it does not remove the bridge team's responsibility to maintain situational awareness, question unexpected information, and take timely action.

Closer attention:

Masters and navigators should consider and address the following when interacting with autonomous systems:

  • Evaluate how an autonomous vessel may detect and classify surrounding traffic.

  • Assess whether the autonomous vessel's intentions are readily apparent to conventional vessels.

  • Recognise the limitations of AIS information and communications with remote-control centres.

  • Anticipate potential uncertainty regarding the autonomous vessel's lookout and decision-making arrangements.

  • Formulate contingency actions in the event that the autonomous craft behaves unexpectedly.

  • Record any unusual encounters as near misses or navigational hazards.

Confirmed finding:


On 17 September, the MAIB issued an interim report concerning the 2025 collision between the crew transfer vessel Iceni Legend and the unmanned surface vessel X18 in an offshore wind farm. The publication of an interim report should not be interpreted as a final determination of cause. It does, however, reinforce the need to prepare bridge teams for increasing interaction with remotely operated and autonomous craft.


Additionally, the IMO's non-mandatory MASS Code took effect on 1 July 2026, establishing an international safety framework for autonomous and remotely operated cargo ships.


22 Sept 2026

Why it matters:

Security instructions must be sufficiently clear to support rapid action without creating confusion between the Master, company security personnel, and external authorities. Ultimately, commercial considerations must never override the Master's fundamental responsibility to protect the vessel and its crew.

Closer attention:

  • Ensure voyage-specific security assessments are current and routing decisions reflect the latest threat information.

  • Implement BMP Maritime Security measures and Ship Security Plan controls practically.

  • Test citadels, communications, emergency alarms, and access controls thoroughly prior to transit.

  • Brief crew members clearly before they enter elevated-risk areas.

  • Maintain immediate availability of medical, fire, and damage-control resources.

  • Provide continuous support and monitoring from shore management throughout the transit.

Confirmed finding:


Security conditions affecting international shipping remain a major operational concern. As of 15 September, the IMO verified 80 attacks on merchant vessels in and around the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in at least 22 seafarer fatalities. Several vessels were reportedly damaged during September, with fatalities, missing personnel, and pollution concerns recorded in individual cases.


Furthermore, the IMO has warned of renewed piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters, including the continued captivity of seafarers.

22 Sept 2026

Why it matters:

Psychological safety is directly connected to operational safety. A person who does not feel able to report harassment may also hesitate to challenge an unsafe navigational, engineering, or cargo decision.

Closer attention:

A credible system should ensure the following:

  • Define unacceptable behaviour clearly and comprehensively.

  • Ensure personnel know precisely how and where to report their concerns.

  • Treat all reports confidentially and make it clear that retaliation is not tolerated.

  • Examine allegations impartially and ensure affected personnel can easily obtain support.

  • Verify that Masters and senior officers fully understand their leadership responsibilities.

  • Monitor reporting patterns from shore management rather than treating each complaint in isolation.

Confirmed finding:


Updated UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency guidance published on 3 September addresses the implementation of the amended STCW Personal Safety and Social Responsibilities requirements. The amendments, in force since 1 January 2026, introduce mandatory competence concerning the prevention of and response to violence, harassment, sexual harassment, bullying, and sexual assault.


Companies should verify that training, reporting channels, and onboard procedures are genuinely understood to establish a credible system.

22 Sept 2026

Why it matters:

Drills should test decision-making under realistic conditions rather than merely demonstrating procedural compliance. Particular attention must be given to the critical time required to detect an emergency, alert the command team, assess the developing situation, and begin an organised passenger response.

Closer attention:

While operators should avoid speculation regarding causation, these events justify an immediate review of the following:

  • Evaluate fire detection, alarm arrangements, and patrols of vehicle, accommodation, and machinery spaces.

  • Verify the control of ignition sources, ventilation, and emergency shutdowns.

  • Confirm watertight and weathertight integrity, stability information, and loading control.

  • Assess passenger accounting systems, clear escape routes, emergency lighting, and signage.

  • Ensure life-saving appliance readiness, effective crowd management, and clear abandonment procedures.

  • Validate crew familiarity with their specific individual emergency duties.

Confirmed finding:


September has provided a severe reminder of the consequences of passenger-vessel fires and loss of stability.


At the opening of the IMO's September cargo and container safety session, the Secretary-General referred to the fire involving MV June Aster near Coron in the Philippines on 9 September and the capsize of Virgo Transport 8 in the Java Sea on 13 September. At the time of the statement, significant loss of life and numbers of missing persons had been reported. Investigations will be required to establish the precise circumstances and causes of these events.

21 Sept 2026

Why it matters:

Anchoring should not be treated as a passive operational condition. Bridge teams must remain continuously prepared for dragging anchor, traffic misjudgement, equipment failure, and the unexpected actions of other vessels.

Closer attention:

The event reinforces the following established navigational controls:

  • Maintain an effective lookout and systematically monitor radar and AIS information on anchored vessels.

  • Assess approaching traffic early and resolve any uncertainty before the safety margin becomes restricted.

  • Challenge and thoroughly verify all collision warnings.

  • Execute avoiding action that is early, positive, and readily apparent.

  • Ensure that machinery readiness accurately reflects the vessel's exposure to risk.

  • Prohibit the use of VHF communication as a replacement for the strict application of the COLREGs.

Confirmed finding:


The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch recorded a preliminary assessment into the collision between the container ship Mira and the anchored crude-oil tanker Primero, approximately nine nautical miles east of Hartlepool on 27 August. The investigation listing was updated in September.


No conclusions should be drawn while the matter remains under assessment.

20 Sept 2026

Why it matters:

A completed risk assessment can become an administrative permission to proceed. For a master or navigation auditor, the decisive question is whether it contains measurable abort, delay or no-go criteria.

Closer attention:

  • Require numerical limits  where practicable: current, wind, under-keel clearance, visibility and tug capability.

  • Record who has authority to postpone or abort.

  • Challenge reliance on previous successful track lines.

  • Verify that dynamic environmental conditions are reassessed immediately before the critical stage.

  • Examine whether commercial pressure has silently shifted the acceptable-risk threshold.

Confirmed finding: 


In the Myra Eckstein casualty, the crew completed company briefings and a green–amber–red assessment, added an experienced captain and complied with the high-water plan. Nevertheless, the tow struck a bridge because extreme current and local hydrodynamic forces exceeded its manoeuvring capability.


The investigation shows that procedural compliance did not make the transit safe.


NTSB report on the Myra Eckstein

10 Aug 2026

Why it matters:

Transitional regulatory changes commonly produce gaps between revised company procedures, certificates, planned-maintenance systems and officers’ understanding.

Closer attention:

  • Sample bunker documentation for the required flashpoint declaration and test method.

  • Verify that service providers and records satisfy the revised lifesaving-appliance regime.

  • Check flag, class and company circulars against onboard manuals and PMS tasks.

  • For gas carriers, LNG-fuelled and polar-operating vessels, conduct a vessel-specific applicability review.

Confirmed change: 


Amendments effective during 2026 include:


  • New SOLAS provisions concerning fuel-oil flashpoint declarations before bunkering.

  • Revised requirements for lifeboat and rescue-boat maintenance, testing, overhaul and repair.

  • Amendments affecting fire-safety systems, protective coatings, the LSA Code and Polar Code.

  • New Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea emission-control requirements from 1 March 2026.

  • IGC Code amendments effective from 1 July 2026.



IMO schedule of amendments

10 Aug 2026

Why it matters:

A paused framework is not evidence that the underlying navigational, security or crew-welfare risk has disappeared. Voyage planning must integrate rapidly changing security information, port access, communications and seafarer consent or welfare concerns.

Closer attention:

  • Revalidate voyage risk assessments immediately before entering the region.

  • Confirm emergency communications, company escalation arrangements and contingency ports.

  • Consider fatigue, anxiety and prolonged confinement as navigational hazards.

  • Ensure masters receive clear authority to delay, divert or stop when conditions depart from the approved assessment.

Confirmed position: 


IMO reports that its voluntary framework assisted 136 merchant ships and approximately 2,900 seafarers to leave the Persian Gulf in June. As of 6 August, the evacuation plan was described as paused.


IMO Strait of Hormuz operational page

10 Aug 2026

Why it matters:

This is a strong casualty-based confirmation that pilotage does not reduce the master’s or bridge team’s responsibility. BRM failed because intervention authority existed but was not exercised.

Closer attention:

  • Include pilot distraction and inappropriate phone use in master–pilot exchange expectations.

  • Audit whether officers understand when and how to challenge a pilot.

  • Use simulator or tabletop scenarios requiring a junior officer to intervene.

  • Look for “polite silence,”  excessive deference and the normalisation of poor conduct.

  • Verify that lookout duties include visual observation, radar/ECDIS monitoring and the correct VTS channel.

Confirmed finding: 


The US NTSB found that the Yangze 7 bridge team, its pilot and the captain of Miss Peggy lost situational awareness through failure to maintain a proper lookout. The pilot was distracted by extended non-operational mobile-phone use.


Crucially, the ship’s bridge team observed the behaviour but did not challenge it. The towboat was detected less than one ship-length ahead.


The NTSB recommended prohibiting non-operational electronic-device use by anyone directing a vessel’s movement. NTSB investigation report

10 Aug 2026

Why it matters:

Inspectors will test practical implementation, not simply the presence of a manual. An officer unable to explain stack-weight limits, securing arrangements or heavy-weather precautions may expose the ship to detention even where paperwork appears complete.

Closer attention:

  • Physically sample fixed and portable securing devices for damage, incompatibility and missing components.

  • Confirm the cargo plan incorporates verified gross masses.

  • Test officers’ knowledge against actual loading conditions.

  • Compare heavy-weather records, routeing decisions and lashing inspections with SMS requirements.

  • Check that cargo does not compromise SOLAS bridge visibility.

Confirmed change: 


The Paris and Tokyo MoUs will conduct a joint Concentrated Inspection Campaign from 1 September to 30 November 2026, alongside routine port-state inspections. Deficiencies can result in detention. The questionnaire covers the approved Cargo Securing Manual, officers’ familiarity, verified container weights, equipment condition, bridge visibility and heavy-weather procedures.


Several questions are explicitly marked as potential detention grounds.


Official Paris/Tokyo MoU questionnaire

10 Aug 2026
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