Why Some Navigating Officers Perform Better Than Others

An assessment-based perspective

Variations in the performance of navigating officers remains a consistent observation during onboard navigation assessments. This persists despite internationally standardised certification under the STCW Convention, which is designed to ensure a common baseline of competence throughout the maritime industry.

This raises a fundamental question for the industry: If certification confirms competence, why does operational performance differ so noticeably at sea?

It is often assumed that such differences relate to nationality, training systems, or cultural background. However, repeated assessments across mixed-nationality crews suggest these are not the primary factors. The more consistent influence is the onboard environment in which officers develop after certification.

Certification and Operational Reality

STCW defines minimum competence at the point of qualification. It does not determine how that competence is applied or developed at sea. In practice, officers with similar certification and sea time can display very different levels of:

• Situational awareness

• Confidence in decision-making

• Risk assessment capability

• Effectiveness in bridge team interaction

These differences often emerge early and are shaped by onboard conditions rather than initial training.

Conditions That Influence Performance

Across multiple vessels and assessments, higher-performing officers are consistently associated with ships where the following conditions exist:

• Active and engaged leadership

• Open bridge communication

• Structured mentoring

• Exposure to complex navigation

• Emphasis on understanding, not just compliance

• Consistent operational standards

• Attention to workload and fatigue

The following case studies illustrate how these conditions influence performance in practice.

Case Study 1: Influence of Leadership

A second officer was observed on two vessels within a year. On the first, the Master’s involvement was limited. Passage plans were checked but not discussed. Bridge interaction was largely procedural. The officer met requirements but showed limited anticipation and hesitated in developing traffic situations. On the second vessel, under a different Master, passage planning was routinely discussed, alternatives explored, and “what if” scenarios considered. Within one contract, the officer demonstrated clear improvement in confidence, situational awareness, and decision-making.

Observation: 

The change was driven by leadership and mentoring, not certification.

Case Study 2: Compliance Without Understanding`

During an assessment, a passage plan met all company requirements. However, the officer could not explain key decisions, including waypoint selection and contingency planning. During the watch, the vessel followed the planned track accurately, but a developing close-quarters situation was identified late, requiring corrective action.

Observation: 

Procedural compliance alone did not ensure effective situational awareness or risk management.

Case Study 3: Effective Bridge Team Culture

On a vessel operating in congested waters, the bridge team demonstrated strong coordination during pilotage.

Key behaviours included:

• Clear communication between Master, pilot, and OOW

• Active monitoring by all team members

• Early discussion of developing risks

• Willingness of junior officers to question and clarify

The operation was completed safely despite challenging conditions.

Observation: 

An open and communicative bridge culture supported shared awareness and effective decision-making.

Case Study 4: Experience Without Depth

An officer with significant sea time, primarily gained in open ocean conditions with some assisting the Master on the bridge during pilotage operations, was assessed during coastal navigation. Despite his years of experience, his performance revealed a clear gap between accumulated sea time and practical competence in complex navigational environments. Further discussion highlighted that much of his bridge experience had involved limited exposure to demanding navigational situations (Pilotage waters). His duties had frequently been influenced by cargo-related responsibilities, restricting opportunities to develop and apply essential skills such as, traffic assessment, position monitoring, and timely decision-making in confined or high-density traffic.

Observation: 

This case highlights that sea time, in isolation, is not a reliable indicator of competence. The depth, variety, and operational relevance of experience are critical in developing effective navigational decision-making skills, particularly in complex navigational environments.

Case Study 5: Pre-Sea Education vs Operational Competence

A junior officer who had performed well during pre-sea training, demonstrating strong theoretical knowledge and passing all required examinations to a high standard, was assessed during onboard navigation duties. The officer showed a sound understanding of rules, procedures, and chartwork in principle. However, when operating in a dynamic environment particularly during coastal navigation and traffic situations there was noticeable hesitation in decision-making, over-reliance on ECDIS, and difficulty prioritising multiple tasks.

During the assessment, the officer tended to follow procedures rigidly rather than adapting to the developing situation. Situational awareness was slow to build, and actions were often reactive rather than anticipatory. Despite demonstrating correct theoretical knowledge when questioned, the practical application of that knowledge in real-time conditions was inconsistent.

Further discussion indicated that, while the officer’s pre-sea education had been strong, onboard experience had been limited in terms of active participation in complex navigation situations. Bridge duties had often been observational, with fewer opportunities to take the lead under supervision in challenging conditions. As a result, the officer had not yet developed the confidence or judgement required to effectively translate theory into practice.

Observation:

This case highlights that pre-sea education provides an essential foundation, but it is not a predictor of operational competence. The development of a capable navigator depends on structured onboard experience, exposure to challenging situations, and active involvement in decision-making under guidance. Variations in training systems, educational standards, and instructional approaches across different countries can influence how officers acquire and apply knowledge. In addition, cultural factors such as attitudes towards authority, confidence in decision-making, and willingness to question or challenge may affect how junior officers engage on the bridge and develop practical competence. These differences do not determine ability, but they can shape learning behaviours and performance if not recognised. Effective onboard training and mentorship are therefore critical in bridging these gaps, ensuring that all officers, regardless of background, are given the opportunity to develop the practical judgement and confidence required for safe navigation.

Discussion

These observations point to a consistent conclusion; officer performance is shaped less by initial training and more by the conditions in which competence is developed onboard.

In particular:

• Leadership influences confidence and decision-making

• Mentoring develops understanding

• Bridge culture affects communication and challenge

• Operational exposure builds practical competence

• Workload and fatigue affect the ability to perform

These factors are largely within the control of shipboard management and company practices.

Implications for the Industry

Improving navigational performance requires a broader focus than certification alone. Key considerations include:

• Recognising the Master’s role in developing officers

• Promoting open communication within bridge teams

• Encouraging structured mentoring as part of routine operations

• Ensuring officers are exposed to complex navigation experiences

• Moving beyond checklist compliance towards risk-based thinking

For navigation assessors, this also suggests the need to evaluate not only individual actions, but the environment in which those actions occur.

Conclusion

The evidence from operational navigation assessments is consistent and difficult to ignore variation in navigating officer performance is not primarily a product of nationality or initial training. It is a product of the onboard environment in which officers learn, operate, and develop. Ships do not simply conduct voyages they shape behaviour, influence decision-making, and ultimately produce the next generation of navigating officers, every interaction on the bridge matters. Every passage plan discussion, every challenge encouraged (or discouraged), and every standard upheld (or compromised) contributes to the competence of the officer. Certification may define the starting point, but the ship defines the outcome. If the industry is serious about improving navigational safety, the focus must extend beyond compliance and certification.

It must address the reality of daily operations onboard:

• Leadership that actively develops officers

• Bridge cultures that enable open communication and challenge

• Mentoring that builds judgement and confidence

• Exposure that turns experience into competence

Because ultimately, safer navigation is not achieved through better certificates alone it is achieved through better onboard environments that consistently produce exceptional navigating officers.